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THE EMPOWERMENT OF THE CRIME VICTIM:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF VICTIM COMPENSATION
SCHEMES IN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA
Over the past twenty years there has been a marked resurgence in
concern for the rights of crime victims.I The enactment of the Victims and
Witnesses Protection Act of 1982 ("VWPA") in the United States, replaced
the notion of the "Forgotten Victim" with the idea of "Victim's Rights." 2
As one commentator stated, "the Victim's rights' phenomenon is now a full-
fledged component of the criminal justice system in the United States." 3
One right now available for crime victims in the United States, as
codified in Title 18 of the United States Code, is the right to restitution for
losses suffered as the result of a crime.4 In addition, a number of states
have amended their constitutions in order to guarantee the rights of crime
victims.5 Not specific to the United States, the expansion of victim's rights
enjoys world-wide growth and acceptance. 6
Australia is one country in which victim's rights to restitution have seen
tremendous growth. Every state in Australia has guaranteed victims their
right to restitution.7
This Comment explores the justifications for using restitution in
substantive criminal proceedings to compensate victims of crime and the
ramifications of such use. The methodology employed in this Comment is a
1. See Robert C. Davis et al., Restitution: The Victim's Viewpoint, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 746,
747 (1992) (discussing a historical overview of the treatment of crime victims in our criminal
justice system).
2. This idea has been expanded upon by David L. Roland in Progress in the Victim Reform
Movement: No longer the "Forgotten Victim," 17 PEPP. L. REv. 35 (1990).
3. See Donald J. Hall, Victims' Voice in Criminal Court: The Need For Restraint, 28 AM.
CRiM. L. REV. 233 (1991) (arguing that the scales have been tipped too far in favor of the
victim at the expense of the criminal defendants' rights).
4. Part (a) of Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 3579. Order of Restitution states:
(a)(1) The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense under this title
or under subsection (h), (i), (j), or (n) of section 902, of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (49 U.S.C. 1472), may order in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law,
that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense.
5. For a brief look at the attempt to unify the various state compensation programs, see
Henry J. Reske, Helping Crime's Casualties: New Model Act Says Victims Must be Informed
of Rights, 78 A.B.A. J. 34 (April 1992). The new model act was approved in August, but is
waiting to be adopted by state legislatures before becoming law.
6. For a discussion on the actual effectiveness of this world-wide growth in the acknowl-
edgment of victims' rights, see Nicholas C. Katsoris, The European Convention on the
Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes: A Decade of Frustration, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
186 (1990/1991). This Comment argues that inadequacy of funding frustrates the intentions of
the member states to compensate crime victims.
7. For a comprehensive look at Australian victim compensation schemes, see Iyla Therese
Davies, Compensation for Criminal Injuries in Australia: A Proposal For Change in
Queensland, 3 BOND L.R. 1 (1991).
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comparative analysis of the victim compensation schemes used in the United
States and Australia.
Part I of this Comment discusses the general justifications for using
restitution in criminal proceedings, focusing on its evolution in conformity
with changes in the substantive goals of the criminal law. Part II discusses
the development of criminal compensation in the United States and the argu-
ment over its constitutionality, demonstrating the advancement in this area
and suggesting the need for further advancement.
In Part III, the focus is on the Australian victim compensation schemes,
with detailed analysis of some of the key similarities and differences among
the various Australian states. This part further focuses on some of the proce-
dural aspects of the Australian schemes, and how they differ from those in
the United States. Part IV compares the critical areas of the compensation
schemes employed by the United States and Australia. Finally, Part V of
this Comment summarizes those comparisons made previously, and offers
possible recommendations.
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE OF RESTITUTION IN SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS TO COMPENSATE VICTIMS OF CRIME
The use of restitution in the criminal arena is not a new concept. It has
been documented in various forms in primitive society, the Middle Ages, and
feudal times. 8 The criminal arena was necessarily composed of the offender
and the victim.9 As time passed, and "society" expanded, the victim's voice
grew softer.'0
In criminal proceedings, the State now stands where the victim once
stood. This substitution, however, is a fairly recent phenomenon."
During the American colonial period, victims were often granted
restitution upon the finding of guilt of the accused.' 2 At that time, resti-
8. For a history of victim restitution, see Thomas M. Kelly, Where Offenders Pay For Their
Crimes: Victim Restitution and its Constitutionality, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 685 (1984).
Kelly begins his discussion of restitution with a short historical overview, including "blood
feuds" of primitive society, "personal vendettas" of the Middle Ages, and payment of a
commission to the King or Lord in feudal times.
9. Id. at 686.
10. See Davis, supra note 1, at 746.
11. The exact point at which the victim of a crime changed from the person to the social
order (the state) is not altogether clear. It has been speculated that the change came as a matter
of efficiency, resulting from urbanization. As the distinction between private (civil) and public
(criminal) wrongs grew, the voice of the crime victim became softer. Id.
12. Restitution was a substantive goal of the criminal proceeding in Colonial America, with
victims taking an active part in the judicial proceedings. However, as noted above, with
growing urbanization, retribution, rather than restitution, emerged as a primary motivation, to
punish the offender. Consequently, where restitution was actually granted, the primary
motivation was not restoration to the victim, but rather punishment to the criminal defendant.
Id. "Incarceration replaced restitution as the customary punishment of guilty offenders." Id.,
(citing Alan Harland, One Hundred Years of Restitution: An International Review, 8
VICTIMOLOGY 190-203 (1983); and Bruce Jacobs, The Concept of Restitution: An Historical
2
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tution was actually viewed as one of the goals of the criminal justice sys-
tem.13 However, with the growth of urbanization, the victim of the crime
became the "social order," with the actual victim left to seek redress in a
subsequent civil trial.'4
The goals of the criminal law eventually became retribution, reforma-
tion, deterrence, and incapacitation.'" Each of these goals demonstrates a
different motivation and objective. The objective of retribution is simply to
punish the offender, motivated by society's desire to see the offender receive
her "just desserts. "16
The objective of incapacitation is to incarcerate the offender so that she
may not commit further social wrongs. This is motivated by society's desire
to keep social malefactors off the streets."' Although conceptually incapaci-
tation addresses the safety concerns of many crime victims, it fails to address
the loss suffered by the victim as a result of the crime.
The objective of reformation is to rehabilitate the offender." This
objective is specifically addressed by the use of restitution in criminal
proceedings. The theory of reforming the criminal defendant may once again
be cognizable as the result of restitution.
The objective of deterrence is to prevent both this offender and other
potential offenders from committing similar crimes.
It has been conceded that these goals simply remain aspirations. 19
However, the criminal justice system has been slow to recognize the
feasibility of restitution to the victim as a valid substantive goal. In order for
any justice system to function efficiently, society must feel it is legitimately
addressing its problems. As such, legitimization of the system itself becomes




15. See United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Cal. 1976), for a systematic
analysis of these goals and the reality of their failure.
16. See Michael Moore, Law and Psychiatry, reprinted in KADISH & SCHULHOFER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 142-144 (5th ed. 1989).
17. However, this objective seems impracticable when confronted with the ever-increasing
problem of jail overcrowding. See Pamela M. Rosenblatt, The Dilemma of Overcrowding in the
Nation's Prisons: What are Constitutional Conditions and What Can Be Done? 8 N.Y.L. Sch.
J. Hum. Rts. 489 (1991)
18. This objective has largely been undermined, as clearly the penitentiary has an ineffective
rehabilitative atmosphere. See Note, Victim Restitution In The Criminal Process: A Procedural
Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1984).
19. With growing crime rates, it is hard to ignore the obvious: that our system of punish-
ment fails to deter people from committing crimes. See Rosenblatt, supra note 17. As such,
retribution remains the only justifiable goal. This is because it requires the easiest and leastjustification; as long as people continue to feel good about punishing criminals, retribution isjustified. See David A. Starkweather, The Retributive Theory of "Just Deserts" And Victim
Participation In Plea Bargaining, 67 IND. L.J. 853 (1992).
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the over-arching purpose of the system.2'
A justice system cannot function autonomously. It must be legitimized
by society's faith in it. This being so, the need for compensation to crime
victims becomes more apparent. As stated by one commentator: "the ability
of the judiciaries to work their will stands or falls with public opinion if...
legitimacy is both a grant from the populace and the essential source of
judicial power." 2'
This idea demonstrates the obvious need for people to believe that a
system in which they place their faith, is working. In order for people to
support the system, they must trust it. It is this belief in the system upon
which the overarching goal of the system rests.
Prior to the recent growth in the recognition of victim's rights, it was
well recognized and commented upon, that people were losing faith in our
criminal justice system.' In 1978, Justice Mosk of the Supreme Court of
California stated, "I must concede there is an element of accuracy to the oft-
repeated contention that 'criminals have all the rights. "I
The crime victim was simply a prosecutor's tool. In addition to the
suffering caused by the actual crime, she often had to endure the added
trauma of prolonged interrogation.2 4 Moreover, she had to carry the
emotional and financial burdens, inflicted on her by the crime, without
compensation. 25
Today, with the rise in the recognition of victim's rights, the crime
victim has actually become a positive force in the substantive criminal
proceedings. As crime victims become empowered by this recognition, the
legitimization of the system is enforced.
In response to the plight of crime victims, the 1970's and early 1980's
marked a rapid growth in the number of victim assistance programs. In
1981, President Ronald Reagan announced the week of April 19th to be
National Victims' Rights Week.26 In 1982, sections 3579 and 3580 were
added to Title 18 of the United States Code.27 Section 3579 states in
relevant part, "The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an
20. See Kevin O'Grady et al., The Importance of Victim Satisfaction: A Commentary, 15
JUST. SYS. J. 759 (1992) (discussing judicial legitimacy).
21. Seeid. at 760.
22. See Davis, supra note 1, at 747.
23. See Justice Mosk, Mask of Reform, 10 Sw. U.L. REv. 885, 889-90 (1978).
24. See Roland, supra note 2, at 35. It has often been noted that victims of crime also feel
victimized by a system that simply fails to take their victimization into account. Id.
25. Id.
26. The early 1980's was a period of unprecedented interest in victim's rights. In 1982, the
year after President Reagan proclaimed a National Victims' Rights Week, the VWPA was
enacted. In 1984, the Victims of Crime Act was passed by Congress. This Act provides for
a restitution account for crime victims funded by criminal penalties assessed in felony
convictions. This same year Pepperdine published its noted series of articles on victims' rights,
commissioned by a grant from the United States Department of Justice, through the American
Bar Association. Id.
27. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3579, § 3580.
4
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offense under this title . . . may order, in addition to or in lieu of any other
penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim
of such offense."28
Section 3580 lists the factors for the court to consider when making a
determination of an award of restitution.29 This is essentially a balancing
test between the loss to the victim and the financial resources of the
defendant.' 0 The restitution award is discretionary so that no substantial
hardship will be inflicted upon the defendant or her dependents. 3'
As the voice of the crime victim once again begins to be heard, the
legitimization of the judicial system strengthens. As such, the justification
for the use of restitution in criminal proceedings is also strengthened. The
demand of the crime victim to once again be heard reinforces the required
foundation of the judicial system.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL COMPENSATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
As the legislatures and courts of the United States began recognizing the
validity of restitution to crime victims, the use of restitution in the criminal
arena became the target of a constitutional battle. This section includes a
discussion of some of the constitutional arguments made by defendants
against the imposition of restitution, and how these arguments were
addressed by the courts.
In the 1970's, courts in the United States began approving the imposition
of restitution in the criminal arena. In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court
in State v. Harris, held that "restitution is not only an appropriate but
frequently a salutary technique in the criminal process, and in the purpose of
the probation system contemplated by the statute. "
32
In Harris, the defendant was ordered to make restitution as a condition
of probation upon conviction for welfare fraud.33 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that imposition of restitution in substantive
criminal proceedings was preferable to a subsequent civil trial for damag-
es. 
34
The court found that ordering the defendant to make restitution had a
28. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3579.
29. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3580:
(a) The court, in determining whether to order restitution under section 3579 of this
title and the amount of such restitution, shall consider the amount of the loss
sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources of the
defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's
dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. State v. Harris, 362 A.2d 32 (N.J. 1976).
33. Id. at 35.
34. Id. at 32.
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significant rehabilitative purpose.35 It stated, "Restitution in a proper case
may ofttimes be a compelling reminder of the wrong done and meaningfully
contribute to the rehabilitation process '3 6 It further stated, "A fine is pu-
nitive. A jail sentence is retributive. But restitution makes sense. 37
Similarly, in 1978, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in State v.
Huggett, that restitution was a "reasonable and appropriate condition of
probation." 3  The defendant in Huggett, like the defendant in Harris, had
also been convicted of welfare fraud.39
The court in Huggett, illustrated a number of reasons justifying the
imposition of restitution in a criminal trial.' These reasons were: (1)
aiding rehabilitation by "strengthening the individual's sense of responsi-
bility;" (2) giving the offender a "positive sense of making a fresh start;"
and (3) "protecting the community's interest in having the victims of crime
made whole." 4'
In 1983, the constitutionality of the statutory provisions of the VWPA
requiring "restitution" to a victim of a federal crime were challenged in
United States v. Welden.42  In Welden, defendants Edward Eugene
Satterfield, Perry Don Allison and Carlton Welden were convicted of kid-
napping and ordered to make restitution to their victims or the victim's
estates .43
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit United States District Court held the
provisions unconstitutional as violating the defendant's Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial on the "civil issue" of restitution.4 The court also
questioned whether the provisions violated the Eighth Amendment,
35. Id. at 34.
36. Id. at 35. The court found that because society has a compelling interest in making the
defendant aware of the wrong she has committed, restitution makes sense because it allows the
individual to make a personal demonstration of change.
37. Id.
38. State v. Huggett, 266 N.W.2d 403, 405 (Wis. 1978).
39. Id. at 404.
40. Id. at 407.
41. United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983). The Huggert court stated
"One who successfully makes restitution should have a positive sense of having earned a fresh
start and will have tangible evidence of his or her capacity to alter old behavior patterns and lead
a law-abiding life. Conditioning probation on making restitution also protects the community's
interest in having the victims of crime made whole." Id. at 407.
42. The provisions challenged in Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983), as set forth
in Sections 3879 and 3580 of Title 18 U.S.C., may be referred to in Appendix "A," following
this Comment.
43. Welden, 568 F. Supp. at 516.
44. The Seventh Amendment provides, "In suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law." The court in Welden, found that since the amount in question
exceeded twenty dollars and the restitution provision of Section 3570 turned the order into a civil
provision, the defendants were denied their right to a jury trial on the restitution order under the
Seventh Amendment. Welden, 568 F. Supp. at 533.
6
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comparing failure to pay restitution to failure to pay a debt.4' The court
reasoned that incarceration for failure to make restitution would be tan-
tamount to "debtors prison.' In addition, the court held the provisions
violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' requirements of due process
and equal protection. This holding resulted from the finding that the provi-
sions allowed too much discretion to rest in both the courts and the Attorney
General.' 7
However, Welden, on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, was overruled in United States v. Satterfield.48 The
Satterfield court held the VWPA provisions constitutional.49
These provisions were recently refined in Hughey v. United States."
In Hughey, the United States Supreme Court held that an "award of
restitution under the VWPA is authorized only for loss caused by the specific
conduct which forms the basis for the offense of conviction."5 '
In Hughey, the defendant pleaded guilty to credit card fraud pursuant to
a plea agreement.52 The court then ordered the defendant to pay a sum
equal to the bank's losses, which was substantially more than the offense to
which he had actually been convicted of (given the plea arrangement)."
The Supreme Court therefore, narrowed the possible expanse of restitution
awards under the VWPA, so that restitution can only be ordered for those
crimes with which the defendant was actually convicted.'
45. The Eighth Amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
46. Although the Welden court expressed "serious doubts" as to whether the provisions
complied with the Eighth Amendment, it construed them so as to pass constitutional muster
only because of a presumption of constitutionality. Welden, 568 F. Supp. at 533.
47. The court stated, "This Court thinks that Congress granted too much discretion to the
courts and to the Attorney General, and , by exceeding its powers of delegation, created a
potential Frankenstein." Welden, 568 F. Supp. at 533. For a more comprehensive discussion
of this case and the arguments over the constitutionality of restitutionary measures, see Andrew
H. Elder, Criminal Law; Sentencing; Restitution: The Restitution Provisions of the Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982 Violate the Fifth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States-United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983), 53 U. CIN.
L. REv. 263 (1984).
48. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 836 (l1th Cir. 1983).
49. The court in Satterfield looked to the legislative history of Sections 3579 and 3580 and
found that "Congress intended to make restitution an element of the criminal sentencing process
and not an independent action civil in nature." Id. Consequently, there was no violation of the
Seventh Amendment. Furthermore, the court addressed the invalidation of the provision based
on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and found the rationale unsatisfactory. The lower
court had found that due to the general terms in which the statutes were written they were open
to possible abuse because of too much discretion in the courts and in the hands of prosecutors.
However, this court found that possible future violations do not make the statute unconstitution-
al.
50. Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 415 (1990).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 412.
54. This holding has obvious negative repercussions in plea arrangements, as illustrated by
Hughey. However, this writer leaves that issue for another article.
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However, a recent California case demonstrates a willingness to broaden
the scope of allowable restitutionary awards. In People v. Diaz," the
defendant was ordered to pay restitution to the victim whose transmission
was damaged when she was forced to make a sharp turn to avoid gunfire on
her front lawn. 6 Diaz, arguing against the imposition of restitution, stated
that, "the restitution order is neither rehabilitative nor directly related to the
(sic) crime. . ."
The court addressed both of the defendant's arguments. First, it
addressed Diaz' rehabilitation argument. The court, in finding that the
imposition of restitution did have a rehabilitative effect upon the defendant,
noted, "Restitution imposed in a proper case and in an appropriate manner
may serve the salutary purpose of making a criminal understand that he has
harmed not merely society in the abstract but also individual human beings,
and that he has a responsibility to make them whole." 58
The court then addressed Diaz' causation argument. It held that the
victim was not precluded from her statutory right to restitution simply
because the damage occurred after Diaz was apprehended. It noted that the
mere unlikeliness of such an event also did not preclude the awarding of
restitution. The court reasoned that a broad cause and effect standard should
be used when awarding restitution to a crime victim.59
III. COMPENSATION SCHEMES USED IN THE AUSTRALIAN STATES
"Compensation is not a conceptual cuckoo in the law nest but a possible
penal objective which can without undue theoretical difficulty, be incorporat-
ed into the notion of criminal justice and even into the concept of punishment
itself. "
A. The Implementation Of The Australian Victim Compensation Schemes
Every Australian state incorporates a scheme for awarding restitution in
a criminal proceeding.6 The first scheme was incorporated in New South
Wales in 1967.62 Although there is no national criminal compensation
55. 20 Cal. App. 4th 1257, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220 (1993).
56. Id. at 1260.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1264.
59. Id. at 1261.
60. Quoted in Tom Campbell, Compensation as Punishment, 7 UNSW L.J. 338, 343 (1984).
61. See Campbell, supra note 60, at 338, in which he states, "Since compensation has long
been an aspect of civil law criminal process it is no longer correct to say that the victim is
entirely forgotten in official responses to criminal activity in developed jurisdictions." See also
Davies, supra note 7, at 1, for a brief overview of the worldwide historical uses of compensation
in criminal proceedings dating back to early Greek, Roman, Jewish, Anglo-Saxon and
Babylonian law.
62. See Davies, supra note 7, at 2.
8
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scheme in Australia,63 a statutory remedy for injuries or death as the result
of a crime exists in every state. 6' The focus here is upon compensation
schemes in New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria, The Austra-
lian Capital Territory, South Australia, Western Australia, and The Northern
Territory.6
In South Australia, Queensland, the Northern Territory, and the
Australian Capital Territory, the adjudication of the restitutionary matter
occurs within the criminal courts.' In the Australian Capital Territory, the
Registrar of the Supreme Court has the discretion to award compensation
even where no criminal proceedings remain.67
In New South Wales and Victoria, tribunals have been established solely
for the purpose of compensating crime victims.6" These tribunals are
distinct from the criminal courts and do not employ the same procedural and
evidentiary rules of the criminal forum. 69 They are less formal than the
criminal courts, with an eye towards expeditious justice.7'
The Australian criminal courts have similarly favored the used of
restitution to compensate crime victims.
The common law in Australia has a long history of awarding restitution
in substantive criminal proceedings. In R. v. Hutchins, the Court stated in
reference to this common law history of awarding restitution:
While an accused cannot be allowed to purchase freedom at the price of
paying for his depredation, one of the factors to which a court may have
regard in fixing his sentence is an undertaking by the accused to make
reparation.7
Moreover, in the Queensland Criminal Code, the judge may, in her
discretion, dismiss a defendant in any property offense case without
63. Although a national Compensation Bill was passed by the House of Representatives in
Australia in 1974, it failed in the Senate, and was not passed. Id.
64. "In circumstances where a victim dies as a result of criminally inflicted injuries, a
statutory remedy exists in each Australian state and territory" id. at 3.
65. As noted, supra note 48, a national Compensation Bill has been attempted to be passed,
but failed in the Senate. See Davies, supra note 7, at 2 for a more comprehensive discussion
on the need for a national compensation system in Australian.
66. Once the courts have jurisdiction over the criminal matter, jurisdiction over the
restitutionary matter is also found, and remains even when the criminal proceeding is terminated.
Id. at 7.
67. The jurisdiction remains simply to adjudicate the restitutionary matter. Id.
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See R. v. Hutchins (1958) 75 W.N. (N.S.W.) noted in, Jocelynne A. Scutt, Victims,
Offenders and Restitution: Real Alternative or Panacea? 56 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 156, 158 (April
1992).
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punishment, if she simply makes satisfactory restitution to her victim. 2 It
has been stated by the Australian Law Reform that "the first line in sentenc-
ing should be discharge without conviction, accompanied where appropriate,
with an order for restitution. 73
The impact of a measure such as this would be to benefit society, the
victim and the defendant. It would help reduce jail overcrowding, restore to
the victim what she lost as a result of the crime, and allow for more effective
rehabilitation of the defendant. As noted earlier, restitution allows for more
effective rehabilitation because it personally involves the defendant in the
rehabilitative process.' Rather than incarcerating the defendant, or making
him pay a fine into some generalized account, he actually sees the harm he
has inflicted upon the victim and personally makes an effort to repair it.75
As such, this is a more effective, and consequently more efficient, method
of criminal adjudication.
One Australian commentator has gone even further than the tradition in
the criminal arena would seem to dictate, by suggesting that restitution
should be used in its pure form, as a gain-based remedy, to actually punish
the offender.76 The rationale for this use of restitution is that there are
many losses due to crime that simply cannot be exactly measured.77
Therefore, the emphasis should shift to what the offender gained "at the
expense of" the victim.
In the recent case of R. v. McDermott, the Federal Court of Australia,
in reviewing the lower court, held "that a pecuniary penalty order must be
taken into account at the time of sentencing and that it was wrong in the
circumstances of the case to regard the pecuniary penalty order as simply the
removal of ill-gotten gains and not as an additional punishment." 71 In
McDermott, the court found that since the defendant had assets, such as real
72. Although the commentator notes that in theory this makes sense, there are a number of
practical problems. Most notably that the victims often do not know that they have these rights
in order to enforce them. Id.
73. The Australian Law Reform found that restitutionary measures are extremely effective
while being the least coercive. Id.
74. State v. Huggett, 266 N.W.2d 403, 405 (Wis. 1978).
75. Id.
76. See Campbell, supra note 60, at 349, who actually takes this even further, invoking the
concept of punitive damages to compensate the victim's time spent and anxiety suffered as a
result of the crime. Although initially this would seem to carry a high level of deterrence,
Campbell speculates that this may not be true. This is because criminals may believe that if they
get caught then there will be nothing to give back. Consequently, Campbell proposes that fixed
penalties would be more efficient in attempt crimes. However, it may be noted that one of the
reasons deterrence measures often fail is that criminals do not believe they will be apprehended.
77. Id.
78. In the Australian Capital Territory District Registry, General Division, the court
considered in McDermott, 49 A. Crim. R. 370 (1990), whether a pecuniary penalty order should
affect a defendant's sentence. The court held that it should, given the surrounding circumstances
of the order, such as whether it would have any deterrent effect upon the defendant.
10
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property, restitution would have a significant deterrent effect.79
Similarly in R. v. Stevens,' ° the Australian Court of Criminal Appeal
found that the sentencing judge had not erred when he took into account,
among other things, the restitution made by the defendant to his victim.8'
Many commentators have traditionally been uncomfortable with using
restitution in its gain-based sense, to punish, because of the tendency to
confuse the criminal issues with the civil issues in a criminal forum. Howev-
er, if restitution is viewed as a substantive goal of the criminal justice
system, such confusion could be abated with adequate procedural safeguards.
B. Who May Recover Under the Australian Compensation Schemes
In New South Wales, the compensation scheme categorizes victims into
two areas, primary and secondary victims. 2 The "primary victim" is a
person who is actually injured as "a direct result of an act of violence"83
The "secondary victim" is defined as a "'person who has sustained injury as
a direct result of witnessing, or otherwise becoming aware of, injury
sustained by a primary victim, or injury or death sustained by a deceased
victim of the act. "'I In the event of death of the victim, New South Wales
provides the most comprehensive criminal compensation scheme.,
In this event, "secondary victims," as well as "close relatives" are
permitted to claim compensation. 6 Similarly, Victoria allows for "depen-
dents" to recover compensation, if they are found to be dependent upon the
decedent's income." However, Victoria, as well as Tasmania, has no
provision for "secondary victims."88 In South Australia and the Northern
Territory, the claimant is required to be both a "relative" of the victim, and
79. The court referred to § 16A of Part lB of the Crimes Act of 1914, which had been
amended in 1990. Part 1B, which prescribes comprehensive sentencing guidelines for federal
offenders may be referred to in Appendix "B" following this Comment.
80. R. v. Stevens, (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal (Vic), 3 February 1976).
81. The defendant in Stevens had been convicted of larceny and falsification of books of
account. The defendant had committed these crimes while working as a manager of a hotel. Id.
82. Id. at 10.
83. The category of "Primary Victim" exists in every Australian state, and is usually
referred to as the "aggrieved person" or the "victim." Id. at 12.
84. The introduction of the "Secondary Victim" categorization clearly evinces a widening
in the interpretation of the word "victim," therefore, allowing for compensation to this larger
group. Id.
85. Id.
86. "Any sibling of a deceased victim who directly suffered consequential injury would
clearly fall within the wide ambit of the definition of a secondary victim." Id. at 9.
87. Id.
88. The dependent may only recover compensation due to financial loss incurred as a result
of the death of the victim. She may not recover compensation for her own victimization as a
result of witnessing or learning of the death. Id.
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financially dependent upon her. 9
In contrast, Western Australia employs an expansive compensation
scheme. Here, the claimant need only be a "close relative," which is defined
broadly.' In addition, there is no requirement of financial dependency.9
These clearly defined Australian compensation schemes indicate both the
force and effect with which restitution may be used in criminal proceedings.
The specificity with which each state defines its victims for the purpose of
recovery, and the actual implementation of the system through either the
criminal courts or specially recognized tribunals, make clear the potential
effectiveness of restitutionary schemes in the criminal arena.
IV. A COMPARISON OF THE CRITICAL AREAS OF THE COMPENSATION
SCHEMES EMPLOYED BY THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA
Victim compensation schemes in the United States and Australia differ
in two important ways. These differences are: (1) the tribunal system, or
its comparable equivalent; and (2) the rights and remedies of the victim.
One fundamental difference between the victim compensation schemes
in the United States and Australia is seen in the Australian use of tribunals
to determine restitution awards.' These less formal tribunals may be
appealed to directly by the crime victim. 3
Australia's use of the tribunal illustrates an inadequacy in the United
States' scheme. This inadequacy stems from lack of knowledge on the part
of the victim that she is guaranteed specified rights, and entitled to com-
pensation for her loss. In addition, an inadequacy in the United States
scheme becomes apparent when contrasted with the less formal structure of
the tribunal system.' If procedural and evidentiary safeguards are main-
tained in the criminal arena because the defendant's liberty is at stake in a
criminal trial, this concern is absent in a decision to award compensation.
It does not necessarily follow that a defendant must be found guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt in order to simply give back to the victim what she has
gained at his expense.
The second fundamental difference between the Australian and the
89. Under these statutes the victim must not only have suffered a financial loss, but must
also have been actually related to the victim. Consequently, any person who, for example, paid
the funeral expenses of the victim, would not be compensated. Id.
90. The term "close relative" has been given a broad definition under the statute, under
which grandparents and stepchildren are included. Id.
91. Under this statute no financial loss need be demonstrated. A showing a being a "close
relative" is sufficient to meet the eligibility requirements for compensation. Id.
92. See Davies, supra note 7, at 5. These tribunals are constituted by experienced barristers
or solicitors of a Magistrate, and their decisions are not open to additional administrative
discretion.
93. Id.
94. As previously noted, the tribunals do not require the same procedural and evidentiary
rules of the criminal courts. See Davies, supra note 7 at 5.
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United States system is seen in the treatment of the crime victim's rights and
remedies. Although crime victims in the United States have been "guar-
anteed" rights by the majority of the states, and are further empowered by
the various victim's assistance programs, if these rights are not enforced, the
crime victim has no standing to challenge the violation."
Furthermore, not only does the victim not have standing to challenge the
lack or inadequacy of a restitutionary award in any criminal proceeding, but
she also has no civil remedy for the additional wrong of non/under
compensation.96
In contrast, the victim compensation schemes employed in Western
Australia and New South Wales, provide a right of appeal.' It seems clear
that in Australia restitution is looked at as somewhat of an entitlement.
However, in the United States, restitution is looked over as an unrequired
privilege. It has always been clear in our system of rights and restraints that
a right without a remedy simply has no teeth.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The rights of crime victims have seen a remarkable increase in
recognition over the past two decades, both nationally and globally. 9 This
increase in recognition was not the result of a united humanitarian effort by
politicians and world leaders. Rather, this was a necessary effect of the
growing de-legitimization of the criminal justice system.9
The state had taken over the victim's traditional place in the criminal
forum and left the victim feeling inadequate and impotent. This global
recognition of the rights of crime victims, therefore, was descriptive, rather
than prescriptive."
Although many commentators have traditionally felt uncomfortable with
muddying up the criminal forum with "civil issues" such as restitution and
compensation, this concept of guaranteeing certain rights to the crime victim
95. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3579 provides in relevant part:
(h) An order of restitution may be enforced by the United States in the manner
provided for the collection of fines and penalties by section 3565 or by a victim
named in the order to receive the restitution in the same manner as a judgment in a
civil action.
Note that sub-section (h) does not give the victim a right to challenge non/under compensation.
It only gives the right to enforce that which has already been granted.
96. Id.
97. See Davies, supra note 7, at 20.
98. See Roland, supra note 2, at 35.
99. See O'Grady, supra note 20, at 759.
100. The efforts to regulate victim compensation were a response to victim's anger with the
system. Enactment of statutes to award restitution to crime victims was simply descriptive of
that which was already being called for and affected. This was not an embryonic prescription
resulting from the foresight of attentive legislators. See Roland, supra note 2.
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does not have to be as fatalistic as commentators would have us believe.' 0'
If the legitimization of our adversarial system (both criminal and civil),
is our over-riding goal, then given the large numbers of crime victims in
today's society, their feeling of empowerment should be conceived as a
virtue, rather than a vice.
Moreover, even if the use of restitution is seen as punishment, rather
than compensation, the distinction is meaningless. It helps neither the crime
victim nor the offender to incarcerate the offender and let her keep what she
stole. If given the choice, the victim would ofttimes simply rather receive
back her property, and the offender would rather give it back than go to jail.
The philosophical line that we have drawn for ourselves is a self-limiting
restraint. There are simply no practical reasons why restitution should not
be imposed in criminal proceedings whenever possible and practicable.
However, with this understanding, and in conjunction with the growth in
recognition of victim's rights, these rights should be enforceable by those
holding them (the victims), against those guaranteeing them (the states).
The Australian system of restitution, in its allowance of the crime
victims to truly have a voice by appealing to specially appointed tribunals,
should be an example to us, if not in form, in substance. It may be
unnecessary and inefficient to form separate tribunals at this late date in
order to decide restitutionary matters. Nevertheless, we may learn from
Australia's recognition and enforcement of victim's rights.
Maxine D. Kersh"
101. According to the holding in Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 827, the criminal/civil distinction
could be addressed with a carefully worded statute.
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APPENDIX "A"
Section 3579. Order of Restitution.
(2) If the court does not order restitution, or orders only partial restitution,
under this section, the court shall state on the record the reasons therefor. (b)
The order may require that such defendant:
(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruc-
tion of property of a victim of the offense-
(A) return the property to the owner of the property or someone desig-
nated by the owner; or
(B) if return of the property under subparagraph (A) is impossible,
impractical, or inadequate, pay an amount equal to the greater of-
(i) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or
destruction, or
(ii) the value of the property on the date of sentencing, less the
value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of the property that
is returned;
(2) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury to a victim-
(A) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary medical and related
professional services and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and
psychological care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in
accordance with a healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
(B) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary physical and occupa-
tional therapy and rehabilitation; and
(C) reimburse the victim for income lost by such victim as a result of
such offense;
(3) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury also results in the
death of a victim, pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary funeral and
related services; and
(4) in any case, if the victim (or if the victim is deceased, the victim's
estate) consents, make restitution in services in lieu of money, or make
restitution to a person or organization designated by the victim or the estate.
(c) If the court decides to order restitution under this section, the court shall,
if the victim is deceased, order that the restitution be made to the victim's
estate.
(d) To the extent that the court determines that the complicating and
prolongation of the sentencing process resulting from the fashioning of an
order of restitution under this section outweighs the need to provide
restitution to any victims, the court may decline to make such an order.
(e)(1) The court shall not impose restitution with respect to a loss for which
the victim has received or is to receive compensation, except that the court
may, in the interest of justice, order restitution to any person who has
compensated the victim for such loss to the extent that such person paid the
compensation. An order of restitution shall require that all restitution to
victims under such order be made before any restitution to any other person
15
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under such order is made.
(2) Any amount paid to a victim under an order of restitution shall be
set off against any amount later recovered as compensatory damages by such
victim in-
(A) any Federal civil proceeding; and
(B) any State proceeding, to the extent provided by the law of that
State.
(f)(1) The court may require that such defendant make restitution under this
section within a specified period or in specified installments.
(2) The end of such period or the last such installment shall not be later
than-
(A) the end of the period of probation, if probation is ordered;
(B) five years after the end of the term of imprisonment imposed, if the
court does not order probation; and
(C) five years after the date of sentencing in any other case.
(3) If not otherwise provided by the court under this subsection, restitu-
tion shall be made immediately.
(4) The order of restitution shall require the defendant to make restitu-
tion directly to the victim or other person eligible under this section, or the
deliver the amount or property due as restitution to the Attorney General for
transfer to such victim or person.
(g) If such defendant is placed on probation or paroled under this title, any
restitution ordered under this section shall be a condition of such probation
or parole. The court may revoke probation and the Parole Commission may
revoke parole if the defendant fails to comply with such order. In detenrnin-
ing whether to revoke probation or parole, the court or Parole Commission
shall consider the defendant's employment status, earning ability, financial
resources, the willfulness of the defendant's failure to pay, and any other
special circumstances that may have a bearing on the defendant's ability to
pay.
(h) An order of restitution may be enforced by the United States in the
manner provided for the collection of fines and penalties by section 3565 or
by a victim named in the order to receive the restitution in the same manner
as a judgment in a civil action.
Section (a)(1) was omitted here as it was included earlier. Also omitted are
any amendments added after this case was decided.
Section 3580. Procedure for issuing order of restitution
(a) The court, in determining whether to order restitution under section 3579
of this title and the amount of such restitution, shall consider the amount of
the loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial
resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the
defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such other factors as the court
deems appropriate.
16
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(b) The court may order the probation service of the court to obtain
information pertaining to the factors set forth in subsection (a) of this section.
The probation service of the court shall include the information collected in
the report of presentence investigation or in a separate report, as the court
directs.
(c) The court shall disclose to both the defendant and the attorney for the
Government all portions of the presentence or other report pertaining to the
matters described in subsection (a) of this section.
(d) Any dispute as the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved
by the court by the preponderance of the evidence. The burden of demon-
strating the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense
shall be on the attorney for the Government. The burden of demonstrating
the financial resources of the defendant and the financial needs of the
defendant and such defendant's dependents shall be on the defendant. The
burden of demonstrating such other matters as the court deems appropriate
shall be upon the party designated by the courts as justice requires.
(e) A conviction of a defendant for an offense involving the act giving rise
to restitution under this section shall estop the defendant from denying the
essential allegation of that offense in any subsequent Federal civil proceeding
or State civil proceeding, to the extent consistent with State law, brought by
the victim.
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APPENDIX "B"
Matters to which a court is to have regard when passing sentence, etc.
16A(1) In determining the sentence to be passed, or the order to be made,
in respect of any person for a federal offense, a court must impose a sentence
or make an order that is of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of
the offense.
(2) In addition to any of other matters, the court must take into account such
of the following matters as are relevant and known to the court:
(a) the nature and circumstances of the offense;
(b) other offenses (if any) that are required or permitted to be taken
into account;
(c) if the offense forms part of a course of conduct consisting of a
similar character-that course of conduct;
(d) the personal circumstances of any victim of the offense;
(e) any injury, loss or damage resulting from the offense;
(f) the degree to which the person has shown contrition for the
offense;
(i) by taking action to make reparation for any injury, loss or
damage resulting from the offense; or
(ii) in any other manner;
(g) if the person has pleaded guilty to the charge in respect of the of-
fense - that fact;
(h) the degree to which the person has cooperated with law en-
forcement agencies in the investigation of the offense or of other
offenses;
(j) the deterrent effect that any sentence or order under consideration
may have on person;
(k) the need to ensure that the person is adequately punished for the
offense;
(m) the character, antecedents, age, means and physical or mental
condition of the person;
(n) the prospect of rehabilitation of the person;
(p) the probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration
would have on any of the person's family or dependents.
(3) Without limiting the generality of sub-sections (1) and (2), in determin-
ing whether a sentence or order under sub-section 19B(1), or 20(1) or
20AB(1) is the appropriate sentence or order to be passed or made in respect
of a federal offense, the court must have regard to the nature and severity of
the conditions that may be imposed on, or may apply to, the offender, under
the sentence or order.
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